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Switch and Footbridge and Terrorist. 
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side of war zones and subsidiary employments that-are relatively easy to 
manage. 
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The goal of this chapter is to explore the nodon of peace appropriate to 
just war thought. Some just war principles generate a number of infer-
ences about peace. 
Traditionally, just war thinking has been divided into two areas of 
moral concern: jus ad bellum, concerned with the political decision 
to go to war, andyW in hello, addtessing the conduct of war. In recent 
years, rwo new areas have emerged: jus post bellum and jus ex hello. Both 
are concerned with the end or aftermath of war: jus post bellum focuses 
on what ought to be done aftet victory, jus ex hello looks at the moral 
aspects of continuing or exidng a war under circumstances where vic-
tory is unlikely. 1 Each derives from jus ad bellum, since treatment of 
war's goals and the conditions under which it should be terminated 
have in the past come u n d e r a d bellum. 
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Jus in Bello: Peace as the Absence of War 
In discussing peace in relation to war, I deal first with jus in bello, since 
there is less to be said than is the case wi th ;w ad bellum. 
Jus in hello thought became prominent in the early modern period of die 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as jus ad bellum diinking receded owing 
to die recognition by legal dieorists that, while there might be such a thing 
as natural law, there was no supranational authority or, for most purposes, 
any enforceable international law. Without them, the notions of legitimate 
authority and just cause were inapplicable in any informative sense. Among 
early modern theoiists, Vitoria notes the difficulty of determining that only 
one side has just cause. GentiU holds that there can be justice on both sides, 
so the "rights of war" must apply to bodi parties. Gtotius follows Ciceio 
in holding diat waging war is not inconsistent with the "laws of nature." 
Hobbes takes that position to its logical conclusion in holding drat natural 
law requires states to fight to promote rheir interests.^  Their views (diough 
not Suarez's) amounted to abandoning>i- ad bellum principles. 
Jus in bello concerns the conduct of war, as well as the treatment of 
enemy soldiers, prisoners, and non-combatants. Back then, it also dealt 
with the forms to be observed when initiating wat, in patticulat the state-
to-state formal declaration of war, along with notifying theit lespective 
citizens drat a state of war now existed.^ It could also include issuing a 
formal ultimatum prior to declaration of war. Some of these forms have 
evolved into the contemporary notion that U N permission should be 
obtained before going to war (except when under direct attack). 
In the jus in bello perspective, peace is simply the absence of formal 
war. War is legally and morally permissible only if it observes certain 
norms and limits, and ;^ in bello norms aim at minimizing the negative 
effects of the state of war. 
Ms in Bello: War and Peace as States-of-Affairs 
Thus, in jus in bello diinking, war and peace are mutually exclusive states-
of-affairs, with peace constituted by the absence of wat. Grotius is probably 
the first to make explicit the notion of war and peace as states-of-affaits; 
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Cicero defined war as a "contention by force." A usage has obtained, how-
ever, which designates by the word not an action but a state {nofz actio sed sta-
tus); dius war is a state of diose contending by force, viewed simply as such.^ 
This legal view of war and peace as mutually exclusive states captures 
the core idea of early modern jus in bello thinking by jurists and rulers. 
Arguably, it has continued to be a, i f not the, foundational element in 
what we today think of as traditional just war theory up to 1914. 
It indicates a rough notion of peace, characterized by the following 
elements. First, peace is to be understood as a legally normative state of 
affairs, equivalent to a state of non-war. In a given instance, the peace 
in question may be characterized by an arms race, border tensions, eco-
nomic or technological sabotage, or (internally) civil unrest and ethnic 
resentment. But that would still be peace, within the meaning Q[jus in 
bello s legal notion of peace. In the jus in bello perspective, the Cold War 
that lasted nearly half a century was not a war. 
Second, only established states have the right to engage in war, and 
that right is subject to their fulfilling various legal formaUties in launch-
ing war and in treating the other state's soldiers and civilians. Outside 
of those boundaries, any military acrion, parricularly rebellion, was 
deemed criminal, analogous to piracy and banditry Social injustice and 
internal polirical oppression were normally excluded from being rel-
evant to the morality of war. 
Third, war and peace are all-or-nothing states; they are not matters 
of degree, e.g., being more peaceful or less peaceful. Fourth, pohtical 
trends towards war or towards peace can play no role within jus in hello. 
Fifth, considering war and peace as states-of-affairs abstracts from the 
agents, i.e., the governments, responsible for creating or choosing war, 
as well as from its causes and jusrificarion (if any), and the beiligetents' 
intenrions. It is concerned only with the agents' conduct ofthe war. 
Accordingly in bello implies that peace is: (a) a srate of affairs, (b) 
defined legally not politically or morally (where morality is independ-
ent of law), as a formal absence of war, and (c) committing states to 
elaborate procedures and restrictions i f they decide to terminate it by 
going to war. 
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Jus ad Bellum's Paradox: War Intends Peace 
Jus ad bellum thought addresses the war decision and the use of war to 
achieve certain goals that include peace. It concerns moving from peace 
to war and from war to peace. Accotdingly, it has significant implica-
tions for how peace is to be understood. 
Classical or pre-modern jus ad bellum thought (e.g., Aquinas) looked 
to notions of legitimate authoiity, just cause, and right intention to pio-
vide the basic framework for evaluating the morality of war-making. 
Restoring a lost or threatened peace and stability was the duty of legiti-
mate authority just cause was constituted by thteats to peace and older 
or to the lives of a significant numbei of the populace, and right inten-
tion aimed at the defeat of those who had unjustly started war or insur-
rection and the restoration of peaceful order. 
A contemporary version oi jus ad bellum thought (1) might expand 
who could qualify as legitimate authority to include the leaders of insur-
lectionaiy gioups and a vaiiety of non-state insthuuons, (2) would sup-
poit in principle the claim that the seeds of war aie sown by oppression 
and injustice, and (3) would (at least in the line of thinking found in 
recent jus post bellum thought) consider that the victotious powers had 
a moral responsibility to establish some elements of a just social order 
in the defeated state. Items (2) and (3) are relevant to the kind of peace 
just war thought is interested in. They also appear to set standards for 
peace.^  
As regards just cause, i f peace weie simply the absence of a state of 
wat, any going to wat would be an attack on peace and hence moially 
unjustifiable. But in taking it that war could be jusrified oi even morally 
required, the jus ad bellum tiadition indicates that the emergence of just 
cause means the formal peace that may still exist is significantly reduced 
in moral value. Augustine goes so far as to say it is no longer a genuine 
peace, since its continuance now depends upon submission to aggres-
sion or worse.'' Even if none ofthe other jus ad bellum condirions were 
met, the possibility that a just cause for going to war could sometimes 
exist implies that the value of peace is not absolute or always overriding. 
That is the first key element in the just war tradition's notion of peace. 
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Right intention has traditionally been taken to mean intending or 
aiming at peace. But (as Augustine remarked) even the wars of aggres-
sors ultimately intend peace.^  Right intention must therefore aim at a 
peace that meets certain moral standards: peace with justice, or peace 
with a sufficiently just international order. The notion of right intention 
implies that, as well as the value of peace, other values would have to be 
promoted, both for their own sake and because they make peace more 
secure. The second key element in the jus ad bellum notion of peace is 
that the right intention crkerion indicates that the value of peace can be 
realized only when its implementation is integrated with at least parrial 
realization of certain other values. 
In the ideal scenario, where the aggressor has been defeated, the vic-
tors' intenrion would be to undo or rectify the injustice or aggression 
that gave just cause for the war. But it may be that as the war progresses 
it becomes clear that they may have to setde for less than complete rec-
tification of the injustice, since the cost of such rectificarion may now 
be disproportionate to the good to be attained. This is the scenario 
where the value of peace may outweigh some of the other values. In 
short: while the formal peace of the absence of war may be of lesser 
value \rvjus ad bellum thought, a comprehensive peace may not be mor-
ally possible, so that the wronged party may have to setde for an imper-
fect peace that does not rectify all or even most of the injustices that 
constituted just cause for going to war in the first instance.^ The ration-
ally assignable relative weighting given to peace and other particular 
values may change during the course of the war. This is a third element 
in the jus ad bellum notion of peace. 
Like War, Peace Emerges from a Context 
In jus in bello thought, peace and war are relatively static notions, 
defined (in part) by various legal criteria, for the purposes of identifying 
the duries and rights of combatants and non-combatants. Jus in bello 
concepts and principles do not address peace or war as such, since they 
apply only within the framework of an ongoing war. 
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By contrast, while most attention is paid to jus ad bellum thought at 
times when war is imminent, it is also relevant during dmes of peace. 
At the time of writing (2016), the US government is aware that there is 
some probabihty of future conflicts with Russia, China, North Korea, 
or Iran. War with any of those countries is not at present imminent 
or likely, so there is scope fot crafting and implementing policies that 
might avert war with those states. Not merely would that be generally 
desirable, it is also whatyW ad bellum implies should be done. I f a cri-
sis occurred in a few years' rime berween the United States and one of 
those states, it would be hatd for the United States to claim it had just 
cause fot going to wat or to persuade anybody (including itself) that it 
was capable of morally realistic right intenrion if in the previous years it 
had been oblivious to the risk of war and had done little to manage con-
flict or deter aggression, or if its earlier responses had been overly placa-
tory or overly aggressive. Similarly, i f a few years from now the United 
States found itself deciding on war with one of those states, what would 
be required to meet the right intention condirion then would probably 
be required now as a matter of polirical prudence. 
Historiographical works on the causes of parricular wars usually have 
much to say about states' polirical failures and miscalculations in the 
years prior to the war. While law plays a primary role with respect to jus 
in bello requiremenrs, its role is smaller—and more ambiguous—^with 
respect to jus ad bellum. Here, the historian and polidcal scientist play a 
latger role, since the causes of war are rooted in cultures, narional needs, 
and state policies that precede the war, often by many years. While the 
range of whar could count as just cause and as right intention is lim-
ited by legal constraints, their specification cannot be ahistorical and 
apolitical: what qualifies as just cause and what qualifies as right inten-
tion are to a significant degiee contextual, which means that it is not 
just a matter of ethics and law, but also a mattei of history and politics. 
History indicates that the just cause criterion has two implications for 
governments: (1) Don't give other countries just cause to go to war with 
you; (2) Within leason, so conduct youi policies that you do not unex-
pectedly find yourself with a just cause for war under circumstances in 
which war is hard to avoid. The law cannot replace the polirical art of 
historically informed management of international relarions.^ 
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Ontologically in jus ad bellum thought, peace is more apdy viewed as 
a relarion than as a state-of-affairs. The development of effective inter-
narional law is unquesrionably desirable, and helps reduce the scope 
for war. But its enforcement depends upon the good will, the power, 
and the interests of the sovereign states, and these change, for better or 
worse, through their relations with other states. 
The classical just war tradition viewed the state's right as based upon 
its duty to protect the people. Its contemporary version refuses to con-
flate protecrion of the people with narional self-defense, noring that the 
people ought not necessarily be thought of as just the state's own ciri-
zens.'° The possibility of morally warranted resort to war is part of a 
theory of good governance, which includes helping to maintain interna-
tional order and protecting the oppressed, and to build whatever peace 
would be politically practical in the context of that twin commitment. 
While international law is important in relation to those goals, it is not 
enough: diere is no algorithm or formal decision procedure that QO\M fully 
replace the role of human polirical judgment of when war is necessary, 
prudent, or justified (three different judgment types). (Even i f there were 
such a formal decision procedure, implemenring or imposing it would 
amount to an undemocradc disempowerment of the peoples of the various 
nations.) Law can go some way towards determining the conditions under 
which going to war would be permissible, but it offers less with respect to 
when going to war would be necessary, and even less with respect to when 
going to war might be morally required of one's own country.^' 
Just cause and right intention norions imply that peace, of the "thick" 
pohtically substantial kind, as distinct from the formal kind, is not a 
given, once a peace treaty has been signed. To use a common slogan: 
after one has won the war, one must then win the peace. That is a mat-
ter of developing a certain kind of relation between the rwo states, and 
maybe even their peoples as well. Building the peace relation between 
the state and other states or relevant non-state agents requires a number 
of coherent policies consistently followed over a number of years. These 
policies and actions should aim to promote order and protect people's 
rights, by a range of policy tools including: mflitary intervention, peace 
enforcement, armed deterrence, arms reduction, outright war, measured 
concessions, being willing to suffer and tolerate certain provocarions, 
and other options. 
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The Practical Goal of Imperfect Peace 
In the mid-nineteenth century, Biitish junst Sir Henry Maine 
remarked: "War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modetn 
invention."*^ This counterintuitive idea merits teasing out. 
While there were short-lived peace movements in medieval 
Christendom, it was not undl the Enlightenment that the idea of abol-
ishing war was seriously mooted. The catastrophe of two wodd wars 
and the arrival of nuclear weapons generated a new urgency about 
eliminating war. Under modern conditions, it was hard to credit the 
view that war was anything but fundamentally irrational. Yet despite 
genetal acceptance of that claim, peace remained elusive. On occa-
sion, governments might find they no longer knew how not to go to 
war. Sometimes, controlled initial moves towards preparation for war, 
intended to deter, might tiigger a chain of events leading to an out-of-
control escalation into full-scale war. 
On the other hand, calls for universal or unilatetal disarmament were 
neither plausible nor persuasive when proposed in a way that cavalietly 
ignored nations' reasonable and durable interests. Given these complexi-
ties, the idea of inventing peace expressed the intuition that the only 
way to find out what peace is to see what works first, leaving theorizing 
until afterwards. 
Mere absence of armed conflict, even when accompanied by serious 
injustice, might still in some contexts be enough peace to satisfy people. 
Where a war drags on with no end in sight, with high casualties and 
considerable collateral harm to the civihan population, the populace 
would probably be glad of a simple cessation of the violence. Formal 
peace is not completely without value. 
At the other end of the scale would be the Kantian idea of perfect 
peace. While unrealizable, and dangerous i f taken to be realizable, it 
could function as a kind of legulative ideal shaping the way govern-
ments and peoples work for peace. What people would view as a decent 
peace, imperfect enough to be practically achievable, would still involve 
considerably more than the mere absence of violence. That is the kind 
of peace to which j '^w ad bellum is oriented. 
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{\)An imperfect decent peace depends on building a political relationship. 
After the formal peace setdement, the political relations that ground 
peace must be buih. After World War I I , relations between West 
Germany and its former enemies in the West were uncertain and some-
times uneasy into the eariy 1960s. The German leaders were unsure of 
whether its former enemies would allow it to reindustrialize or to cre-
ate its own army later whether they would sustain it against encroach-
ment by the USSR, and later yet whether they were merely tactical 
allies against the USSR or were genuine friends. At the time of German 
reunificarion in 1990, German uncertainty about its aUies' atritudes 
received some confirmation in French and British reluctance to endorse 
reunification, which was counterbalanced by the United States' une-
quivocal support. Even half a century after Worid War I I , the peace pro-
cess was not enrirely complete. 
(2) An imperfect decent peace is the morally appropriate goal. 
In modern rimes, while ethics is seen in certain quarters as nebulous 
or even subjecrive, law is viewed as more serious and objective in rela-
tion to establishing a global jusrice. Yet the legal approach is inevita-
bly drawn to absolute notions of war and peace, for once the law is in 
place it must be obeyed, regardless of pohrical circumstances or pruden-
tial judgment. Jus in bello principles can be given a significant degree 
of legal embodiment. But attempting to come up with law that deter-
mines, for any government, the circumstances under which it is pro-
hibited, permitted, or required to go to wat would be overreach that 
might on some occasions do more harm than good, not to menrion that 
it would effectively eliminate governments as legitimate authorities rela-
tive to war and peace, replacing them solely with the law (or rhe UN).!"* 
Such perfectionism in this area is poliricalfy naive, and that is a moral 
failing. Jus post bellum thought perhaps relied on an image of war overiy 
focused on the United States' mihtary engagements in the 1980-2003 
period with the hope that great military power should be able to guar-
antee comprehensive polirical justice thereafter. Here, war's end and 
subsequent peace could be thought of primarily in legal terms. But such 
cases represent only a tiny minority of wars and their endings. 
A morally and legally perfect peace is rarely attainable. The 
Enlightenment dream that with enough law and just social structures 
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war would (as Marx said of the state) "wither away" natuially died in 
the honors of the twentieth century; we now know too much histoty 
and know far more than did the Enlightenment about the dark side of 
the human subconscious and its atavistic impulses.'' To the extent that 
the tacit ideal of perfect peace easily attainable shapes people's interpre-
tation of the jus ad bellum criteria, it genetates an excessively stringent 
apolitical interpretation of them that will either point towards the wag-
ing of total war, or else make the just war tradition converge on paci-
fism. Each outcome undermines ji/s ad helium thinking. 
(3) That an impeffect decent peace may be a cause of later wars is mor-
ally tolerable, provided the peace holds for a significant period of time. 
Most peace setdements contain the seeds of future wars. No marter 
how carefully the peace setdement is crafted, sooner or later subsequent 
historians will trace at least some of the causes of a later war to that set-
dement. But it would be unteasonable to take this fact as necessatily ren-
dering the setdement morally flawed. Just as there could be no war to 
end war (othet than one that wiped out the human race), so there can be 
no peace settlement that eliminates the need for future such settlements. 
Where it is obvious to the relevant governments at the time of the 
settlement that the peace they ptopose has a high probability of leading 
to war in the not-so-distant futute, they act wrongly in imposing such a 
peace. A similar verdict can be rendered in cases where the peace terms 
are so onerous for the defeated patties (e.g., the terms of the March 
1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and Russia) 
that they will probably repudiate them at the first opportunity. In such 
cases, there are good grounds for arguing that the treaty fails to intend 
peace, and intends instead eithei conquest oi strategic positioning fot a 
future war with the defeated power, neither of which could be morally 
acceptable. 
Here I am concerned with the cases wheie the peace tieaty is not obvi-
ously flawed in such a fashion, and seems to reasonable obseivers to give 
some hope for future peace between the former belligerents. Even in such 
cases, it is the rare peace settlement that lasts for more than a century 
Even where the defeated power is not meditating revenge or resumption 
ofthe wai at the eadiest opportunity, even where the victor's government is 
not planning on ignoring the restraints of the tieaty to take unfair advantage 
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of die defeated country it is still die case that some of the unintended con-
sequences of the war and its conclusion may include conditions increasing 
the probability of a subsequent war. Compared to die 1918 Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, the various treaties of 1919-1920 with the defeated Central Powers 
were less predatory and to some extent aimed at doing justice to formedy 
subject peoples, and yet they too were bitterly resented by die defeated 
countries, notably Germany and Hungary As can be expected, grossly 
unjust peace-treaties have a high probability of generating future war, but 
even relatively just and moderate peace treaties may in historical hindsight, 
serve to make war more likely.''' 
The 1815 Congress of Vienna was relatively successful in stabilizing 
Europe after the upheaval of the Napoleonic wars, i f die fact that there was 
no general European war for the next 100 years can be taken as evidence 
for that claim. Of course, since there were numerous smaller European 
wars after 1815, it would be foolhardy to claim that the Congress settle-
ment had no causal role in relation to subsequent wars. But, since eight-
eenth century Europe had suffered four major continent-wide wars, and 
since no general European war occurred between 1815 and 1914, the 
Congress of Vienna's peace setdement appears comparatively successfiil. 
That imperfect achievement, even if partly a matter of luck, must suf-
fice from a moral viewpoint: the way a war is ended must be judged rel-
atively successful i f it is followed by at least 30 years' peace between the 
belligerents. Even the armed stalemate between North Koiea and South 
Korea since 1953 would seem, certainly ro Koreans who lived through 
the ravages of the Korean war (1950-1953), to count as a relative suc-
cess in providing peace and stability for a half century 
In cases where former enemies become allies, perhaps friends, as 
Japan and Germany became US allies and friends after Worid War I I , 
or Prussia and Austria became allies and friends after their brief war in 
1866, it counts as a very successful peace-making, even i f one of the 
causes of its success is the fear of a mutual enemy These outcomes or 
aftermaths of war suggest the value for a government (like the United 
States), envisaging the rising probability that it may have to go to war 
with a certain country of thinking through what jus ad bellum's right 
intenrion criterion would mean, not just for the war and its termina-
tion, but also for the subsequent future relarionship with that country 
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(4) An imperfect peace provides the opportunity for, and a fragile peace 
may even give impetus to, reforms that promote justice, thereby reducing the 
probability of future conflict. 
This condition is pardcuiatiy applicable in the case of intetcommunal 
or ethnic conflict. People value peace not just for the good of not hav-
ing armed clashes in their towns and ciries, but also for the goods that 
are made possible by the absence of armed conflict.''' The goods of a 
populace that is fed and teasonably secure, of a working economy of a 
functioning legal system and some protection of people's rights, depend 
on the existence of an organized society not torn apart by war or even 
constantly destabilized by lowdevel conflict. Such a sociery where those 
goods obtain might sdll fall short of being a just society, but at least it 
is a functioning society, of some value to ordinary people compared to 
prolonged anarchy The point is: such a society is sufficiendy secure that 
it can afford to spend less on its military and more on feeding, educat-
ing, and enriching hs citizens. The fruits of peace enhance the peace. 
Approaching the issue from the other side, wars and social disorder 
arise from the failute of good governance, and failure of the state to pro-
vide those social goods makes for war and conflict.'^ 
The idea that peace has to be constructed can sound eithet Utopian 
Of grim. The Utopian sound occurs when it is taken (often by pacifists) 
to mean that with good will, peace can be constructed and going to war 
will never even seem necessary'^ The grim note is struck by the political 
realist who holds that, while no parricular war is inevitable, the worid 
is unlikely ever to be completely ftee of war. The pacifist says: " I f you 
want peace, work for jusrice, and you won't have to fight." The real-
ist says: " I f you want peace, work for justice, and be prepared to fight 
for them." Michael Howatd remarks that the victors in Worid War I I 
drew the realist inference: "In the piocess [of the wat] it had become 
cleai that militaiy powei was necessaiy not only to the establishment, 
but also to the preservation of peace." '^' After 1945, small European 
countries like Norway Denmark, Nethedands, and Belgium abandoned 
their previous neutrality in favor of collective secuiity; so, notably, did 
the United States. The option fo i collective security is based on the hard 
lesson that preserving peace requires a realistic military policy and a 
pioporrionate mihtary establishment capable of fighring a serious war. 
A peace-preserving military must also actively keep up to date, for just 
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as certain forms of war become obsolete, so the forms of feasible peace 
may also change over time.^' 
Building the Peace-Relation 
I have argued that peace is better understood as a relarion rhan as a state 
of affuirs. Classifying it as a relarion directs attenrion to the enriries that 
it relates, which, in the context of the ethics of war, are polirical agents 
(whether individual heads of government or communities). A number 
of points can be added. 
First, the quality of the relation will vary from instance to instance. 
In 2017, the United States is at peace with Japan and at peace with 
China, so here are two peaceful relations involving the United States. 
The US-Japan peace-relarion is considerably deeper and stronger than is 
the US-China peace-relarion. Japan is an ally of the United States and 
has a similar political system, whereas China has a different polirical sys-
tem, and is not an ally but a rival that aims to reduce US influence in 
East Asia. Outbreak of war berween the United States and Japan has 
miniscule probabiUty, war between the United States and China at some 
point in the next 20 years has a non-trivial probabflity 
Second, relarions evolve and change. Assuming neither the United 
States nor China wants war, each government has to develop the rela-
tion between them, while seeking to protect its own interests, in a way 
that ensures war does not happen. The development of the relarion 
can be expected to include both progress and setbacks. I have, earlier 
in this chapter, argued that jus ad bellum's just cause and right inten-
tion require taking cognizance of the ups and downs of international 
relations, as well as the danger of misunderstanding and miscalculation 
when the quality of the peace-relation between two states is poor. In the 
crisis when war looms, consideration of just cause cannot be confined to 
focusing on one parricular acrion taken by the other side; it must be ret-
rospective on the recent history between the two states. The right inten-
tion condition will require not merely consideration of what strategic 
defeat of the other state would amount to but also some projection, of a 
realistic kind, of the future relation between the two states. 
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Third, the idea of peace as a relation has intuitive appeal in the con-
text of ethnic, religious, or racial intercommunal tensions periodically 
erupting into armed conflict. In the case of such divided communities 
recovering from or seeking to avoid future intercommunal conflict, trea-
ties and other legal instruments may be infrequent. But even where they 
are used, it is usually in relatively acute awateness of the fact that no set 
of legal arrangements will alone sufflce to keep the peace.^ ^ 
Fourth, when each side recognizes that there are goods and benefits 
available to it provided it cooperates with the other side, and recognizes 
rhat internadonal telations ate not a zero-sum game and that its own 
long-term interests may sometimes be served by judicious assistance of 
the other, this amounts to a recognition of there being common goods-
common because only cooperation can achieve them.^^ Even the United 
States and the USSR, avowed enemies thtoughout the Cold War era, rec-
ognized that they shared an interest in avoiding a nuclear war. 
For any relation between states, communities, and persons, the bot-
tom line of "What do I get out of it?" has to be factored in. Building 
peace depends upon seeing one's own state benefiting from providing 
some space for the othet to floutish. An important patt of the peace-
relation will be the give-and-take of negotiating with each other, bar-
gaining, persuading and conceding, learning from the other, and slowly 
working out the specifics of the concrete good of a peaceful relation. 
Peace: What Kind of Good? 
Christine Korsgaard has drawn attention to the difference between two 
distinctions in goodness or value^ "*: the means/end distinction and the 
extrinsic/intnnsic distinction.25 That clarification is helpful in relation 
to specifying the kind of value peace represents. 
As legards die means/end distinction, the just war ttadition deems peace 
impottant enough to qualify as of value as an end. There seems no need 
to argue for that. Interestingly it is also good as a means. In most cases, 
the end of peace is promoted by peaceful means and practices, includ-
ing diplomacy and judicious concessions to the interests of others, even 
down to using non-aggressive language, as already noted. In the case of 
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two countries sliding towards war, where there is past unhappy history yet 
where neither wants war and is open to negotiation, the peacefijl means of 
renewed dialogue, compromise, mediation by others and the like ate the 
most likely to avert wan fiere peace has instrumental value, for there is just 
enough of a peace-relation remaining berween them to make it possible to 
move away from war widiout losing face or suffering political disadvan-
tage. Under happier conditions, where two states are friends and alhes, the 
peace-relation is also enjoyed in the very activity of deepening that peace. 
Turning to the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction, peace being a relation 
means that it is an extrinsic and not an intrinsic good. One of Korsgaard's 
purposes in making rhe disrinction was to draw attenrion to rhe fact that 
something being good as an end did not mean that it was intrinsically 
good. That is illuminating in this context. Her distincrion challenges the 
temptation to assume that peace being good as an end is thereby intrinsi-
cally good so that it necessarily has significant value in all circumstances, 
no matter how unjust or life-threatening the relational context in which it 
is gtounded. For reasons given eariier, this view is incorrect. 
Where it is realized or instantiated in a relation berween rwo srates or 
communities, it will be part of a nerwoik of relations between them. The 
holistic concrere relation between two states, where the peace berween 
them is so deep-rooted and established that they are not merely not at war, 
nor even merely allies, but friends, instantiates several distinct relational or 
extrinsic values. The deepening of the peace-relation and rhe realization of 
its value requires a heuristic approach that can perceive that the political 
and public policy steps creating that concrete good may become available 
only as time goes by and eatlier steps have been taken. Peace is a relation, 
and the process of deepening ir does not quickly reach a terminus. 
Notes 
1. For a summary o f > ^ post bellum's thought, see Orend (2005). On jus 
ex bello, see the Symposium on the topic in Ethics 125 (April 2015), in 
parricular Di l l (2015). 
2. Reichberg etal. (2006): for Vitoria see pp. 311, 318-322; for Gentih 
see pp. 374-375; for Grotius see pp. 393-395, 414; for Hobbes see 
pp. 444-447. 
20 J.G. Murphy 
3. For convenience, I shall speak of states in this chapter. Fiowever, the 
U N and other international bodies, as well as the non-state political 
leadership of ethnic groups or communities can also qualify as legiti-
mate authorities. 
4. Reichberg et al. (2006,393). 
5. Later-developed criteria (reasonable prospect of success, last resort, pro-
portionality) add litde more to the content of jus ad beUum's notion of 
peace. 
6. Augustine (1972), Bk XIX, chapter xii , 869: "One who has learnt to 
prefer right to wrong and the rightly ordered to the perverted sees that 
the peace of the unjust, compared with the peace of the just, is not 
worthy even of the name of peace." See Clausewitz (1984, 370), for 
a related idea: "It is only aggression that calls forth defense, and war 
along with it. The aggressor is always peace-loving; he would prefer to 
take over our country unopposed." 
7. Augustine (1972), BkXLX, chapter xii, 866-867. 
8. See Murphy (2014, 102-112), and Fabre (2015, 631-652). 
9. See Murphy (2014), particularly chapters 4 and 5. 
10. For a fine overview of the classical theory, see NefF (2005). There are 
interesting parallels in Rodin (2002), with respect to self-defense not 
being the primary purpose of justifiable resort to war. 
11. While 1 am in sympathy with the contemporary "Responsibility to 
Protect" doctrine, it is what Kant called an imperfect duty; determining 
its moral and political implications for particular states is not easy and 
seems likely to be highly qualified. 
12. Howard (2000, 1). 
13. A case in point might be the Syrian civil war, which commenced in 
2011 and still continues at the time of writing (2016), and has caused 
about half-a-million deaths and the displacement of 7 million people, 
including more than 4 million refugees. 
14. See Murphy (2014), chapter 3 for argument co the effect that there is 
often more than one legitimate or competent authority relevant to war 
decisions. 
15. On the aggressiveness that can drive war, see Kainz (1987), chapter 5. 
16. Kennan (1951, 69), cites the French historian Jacques Bainville's com-
ment on the 1919 Peace of Versailles as a peace "too mild for the hard-
ships it contained." 
17. See Murphy (2014), chapter 2, on the goods of peace. 
5 Just War Thought and the ISJotion of Peace 121 
18. Spinoza, Political Treatise, chapter 5, section 2; cited in Reichberg et al. 
(2006, 452). The idea goes back to Cicero and Augustine. Aquinas 
states diat the building of peace is the work of justice and charity; see 
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I I . i i , q. 29, a. 3; cited in Reichberg et al. 
(2006, 174). Clausewitz's thesis that war is a continuation of politics 
conducted by additional means is consistent with the idea; Clausewitz 
(1984, 80-81, 87-89, and 605). 
19. It also assumes that human beings are highly rational. See Cherniak 
(1986). 
20. Howard (2000, 73), emphasis in text. 
21. See Pasquino (1993, 80), where he remarks that war is "the concept 
that makes it possible to understand the forms as well as the existence 
of peace and order" 
22. The 1998 Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement that largely terminated 
conflict in Northern Ireland was a beginning, more than a conclu-
sion. Violence was ended or suspended, in order to start on a project 
to which each community had politically committed itself The project 
set a mutually agreed agenda for how to live with difference, acknowl-
edge the other's political right to exist, forgive the violence inflicted by 
the other side and move on. They were aware that the Agreement itself 
would solve nothing i f chey didn't "work" it. 
23. On these themes, see Axelrod (1984) and Cronin (2003). 
24. Here, I ignore possible distinctions between goods and values. 
25. Korsgaard (1996). 
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Prospect cA Peace 
Anne Schwenkenbecher 
Introduction 
Accorditrg to traditioiral Just War Theory's jus ad bellum, a warring 
agent must have the right intendon, that is, the intention to achieve the 
just cause by way of a mditary campaign and that campaign must have a 
sigmficant chance of succeeding. Contemporary just war scholars focus 
increasmgly on the importance o f > . ; , . . , ^.//^^-justice after w a r - f o r 
the legiumacy of military campaigns. Some authors argue that violent 
agents must have strategies for establishing a peaceful and just rule after 
military operations cease.' 
T ' K ^ ^ ' o m ^ / ' . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ g military inrerventions, for example, in 
Libya 2012) have failed borh in their (narrow) pohtical goal of stopping 
human rights violations, but also in their (wide) political goal of pad 
iymg the respective regions and promoting transitions towards more 
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